Mill provides a brilliant analysis and commentary on the give and take between the need for government protection and the exercise od individual responsibility. This is now the third time that I have read this book since my college days and I find that I get much more from reading the text each time I read it / separated by a decade each time.

This is a nice inexpensive edition of On Liberty with a solid introductory essay. Mill's primary concern was to address the potential problem of the "tyranny of the majority" posed by the emerging democratization of society. His concern was prompted specifically by de Toqueville's account of the USA. Mill is concerned not just with the way government could impose conformity to majority views but also with general social pressures for conformity. In opposition to the dangers of majoritarianism, Mill proposes 2 versions of the Harm principle; the first the basic idea that whatever doesn't cause harm is permitted. The second and more restrictive version emphasizes violation of duties to others. Mill argues his case very well, addressing both general principles and specific problems of contemporary British society. In line with his utilitarian approach, he argues vigorously that human improvement requires the type of freedom and tolerance implied by his Harm Principles. This is also in a real sense the weakness of On Liberty. Mill's version of utilitarianism is not the hedonistic utilitarianism of Bentham and his father, nor preference utilitarianism, but a more vague assertion of what is needed for human progression. Well written, and often quoted, this is one of the accessible major texts in the canon.

I ihave read Mill's On Liberty three times now. The Bromwich and Kateb version is the most helpful, as we not only get to read Mill's essay, but 6 supplementary essays - two "introductions" and four sometimes critical "reinterpretations" by respected theorists.

Milll's basic point is simple: people should be left free to think and do as they please unless what they are doing causes actual harm to others. Mill's essay is spent both giving reasons for this principle, and exlporing what the principle means in practice.

He offers a plurality of reasons for his libertarian ideas, some utilitarian in nature and some based on (what some might call) natural law. Not only does freedom of action and thought encourage innnovation, keep public discussion vigorous, and lead to a more effective social network than government incursion, but people just-plain prefer directing their own lives to being directed from outside.

Mill gets into sticky territory, however, when he talks about the libertarian principle in concrete terms, as his distinction between what is private and what is public is often less clear than he might want. Should persons be free to tell others to do harm to themselves? Yes. Should parents be free not to educate their children? No. Should "vice-merchants" like bars, gambling parlors, and pornographers be free to conduct business without heavy government regulation? No. Should people be free to marry a plurality of spouses? If mormon, yes. If British, no.

My biggest criticism - and a criticism offered in Richard Posner and Jeane Bethke Elshtain's essays - is that Mill is all over the map when his principle is "put to the real world" because the distinction between public and private is just-plain fuzzy. Another interesting criticism, brought up in Elshtain's essay, is that Mill demonstrates a very unjustified bias in favor of experiment over tradition (where the former seems always presumed inferior to the latter).

In short, I like Mill's essay but see it as an edifice built on not-quite-solid sand. Mill relies on seperate categories, public and private, that are just not clear and distinct enough to be distinct. (While Dewey may have gone too far in the "all acts are social" direction, I think Dewey hit closer to the truth.) This is why the six supplementary essays in this edition are a nice touch.

In the Introduction to "On Liberty," Currin Shields, an English egghead, bemoans the fact that Mill's most "famous" essay is "more talked about than read."

I'm surprised it is even talked about, and I am very much NOT surprised that hardly anyone reads it. Mill takes about a hundred and twenty pages to say what could be (and was) summed up in an epigram: People should be free to do whatever they want, as long as it does not harm anyone else.

Not only does Mill subject the reader to pages and pages of supererogatory writing, but his prose is the epitome of Victorian verbosity, with more modifiers, clauses, footnotes, and parentheticals than there are alcoholics in Butte, Montana. (And there are a LOT of alcoholics in Butte, Montana.)

I guess if you're studying philosophy, you're gonna have to read this thing sooner or later...likewise if you're an autodidact.

In many ways, one is tempted to think that there is no such thing as liberalism alive in America today. It would do many well to read the work of the Englishman Mill in order to understand much of what is called both "liberalism" as well as "individual liberty." In addition, one of the growing issues of the contemporary political landscape in America is a polarization which is wholly unnecessary when analysis is applied the current plane of consideration. The reason for this conspicuous lack of reason for polarization is made obviously clear when one reads a work on liberal thought like that of Mill's. For Mill, individual liberty is a question both of social and political proportions, demanding a lack of interference by both government and social pressures. Additionally, he is keen in his analysis of the need for humility when it comes to humanity's apprehension of the Truth, thus necessitating free speech as a vehicle for the continual realization of those parts of the Truth which man so often forgets because of personal bias.

However, the analysis is weak insofar as it also denies the need for structures to educate humanity in a fallen world. His criteria for legal and social sanctions does overlook the necessity to draw on tradition to properly shape those in the world (while maintaining individual dignity). While he acknowledges that it would be preposterous to deny the necessity of interrelationships and sharing of experience, Mill remains somewhat weak on the necessity of tradition and community as related to individual liberty. However, on the whole, the work presents a decent overview of the need to acknowledge individual dignity through the liberty of the individual. Indeed, all communal criticisms aside, On Liberty does indeed serve as a corrective against crass traditionalism which propagates itself without true individual consent and embrace. Therefore, even in its weakness, it remains strong as a key text on the primacy of the human individual as the recipient and follower of the Truth. In a day when liberty is shouted by groups who have no interest in talking to each other, such a small text would do well to make all groups realize that our American (and indeed Western) goals aren't that different, that we are united in trying to express human dignity through the individuals.